3rd Circuit Court to Take Landmark Cell Phone Privacy Case

We now have a location for the upcoming landmark privacy rights legal battle over what the proper legal standard should be when prosecutors demand cell phone location data. As reported in Law.com the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals will hear arguments this week.

First, some background: What makes GPS devices a useful law enforcement tool (i.e. they track our whereabouts) is precisely what also makes them a privacy threat.

An editorial by the New York Times last year on the case, and whether law enforcement has the right to install GPS tracking devices in suspects vehicles without probably cause or a warrant hit the nail on the head:

A federal appeals court in Washington, D.C., heard arguments last week about whether police should have to get a warrant before putting a GPS device on a suspect’s car. It is a cutting-edge civil liberties question that has divided the courts that have considered it. GPS devices give the government extraordinary power to monitor people’s movements. The Washington court should rule that a warrant is required.

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The Supreme Court has not considered the question of whether the police need a court order to install a GPS device. The government has tried to draw an analogy to a 1983 case in which the court ruled that the police do not need a warrant to use a radio beeper to track a vehicle on public roads, but the circumstances were different. In that case, the police were conducting visual surveillance of a particular suspect’s movements, and a beeper augmented the officers’ senses. A modern GPS device is a far more potent means of tracking people than a beeper

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The New York Court of Appeals, the highest New York court, got it exactly right earlier this year, insisting that permitting police to install GPS devices without judicial oversight would be “an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.” As technology advances, government will continue to acquire new and more efficient ways of monitoring people. It is critical that the privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment keep up with those advances.

Documents released by the ACLU have showed that of the states randomly sampled, New Jersey and Florida used GPS tracking without obtaining probable cause or warrants. Four other states, California, Louisiana, Indiana, Nevada and the District of Columbia reported having obtained GPS data only after showing probable cause.

Those documents were part of the ongoing lawsuit by the ACLU and Electronic Frontier Foundation on how the government tracks cell phone users. As these two privacy protection stalwarts argued in those cases, government tracking without a probable cause or warrant is a violation of the Constitution's Fourth Amendment, which guards against unreasonable search and seizure. Government prosecutors have argued that only a court order showing the tracking data is relevant to a criminal investigation is needed.

Adding fuel to the fire was last December's rather astonishing news that Sprint received 8 million law enforcement requests for GPS location data in just one year. The Talking Points Memo ("How Easy Is It For The Police To Get GPS Data From Your Phone?") added some needed context on the revelations:

Police can in some cases track cell phone location by merely telling a court that the information is relevant to an investigation, a legal expert tells TPM - a fact that may partly explain how law enforcement racked up 8 million requests for GPS data from a single wireless carrier in a year. An increasingly popular and easy-to-access surveillance tool for police, GPS data is not currently protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the standards for gaining access to the information are murky and highly variable. That's partly because one of the statutes that bears on the issue was passed in the mid-1980s, before many of the technologies involved were invented. And Congress hasn't done much to update the law since.

Now, we are one step closer to getting a final answer - or at least some precedence - on this fundamental and uncharted Constitutional question.

Law.com reports:

Justice Department lawyers argue that, by statute, they need only show "reasonable grounds" to believe that such records are "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." But a federal magistrate judge in Pittsburgh strongly disagreed in February 2008, issuing a 52-page opinion that said the prosecutors must meet the "probable cause" standard.

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Now, in an appeal of Lenihan's ruling, the 3rd Circuit will become the first federal appellate court to tackle the question as Justice Department lawyers square off against a coalition of privacy and civil liberties lawyers from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy & Technology and the American Civil Liberties Union.

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As cell phone users change locations, the cell phones "automatically switch cell towers," she wrote, and telephone companies "track the identity of the cell towers serving a phone."

In urban areas, where towers have become increasingly concentrated, Lenihan said, tracking the location of just the nearest tower itself can place the phone within approximately 200 feet, and triangulation data can provide an even more precise location, as close as 50 feet.

Phones equipped with global positioning system, or GPS, capabilities, can be tracked extremely accurately, Lenihan noted. Lenihan concluded that the data sought by the prosecutor amounted to "tracking information," and that Congress clearly intended to require prosecutors to meet a probable cause test to secure such data.

The Justice Department argues that Lenihan got the issues wrong because the statutes clearly allow the government to require "a provider of electronic communication service" to disclose "a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber."

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But Freiwald argues in her brief that "to deny Fourth Amendment protection based on the government's assurance that it seeks only limited [cell phone location data] flouts the fundamental principle that Fourth Amendment protections may not be left in the hands of law enforcement agents."

Bankston, in a brief jointly filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the ACLU and the Center for Democracy & Technology, urges the 3rd Circuit to uphold Lenihan's ruling on the grounds that Congress intended to give judges the discretion to deny such requests and require prosecutors to meet the ordinary standard for a search warrant.

Cell phone users, Bankston argues, have an expectation of privacy in such data because they "simply do not voluntarily expose their location whenever they make calls and receive calls ... nor do they do so merely by turning on their cell phones."

Click here for more.

I'd like to know more about those specific cases in which probable cause was not established and the tracking was done without warrants. We have seen too many examples of the government and law enforcement - particularly in recent years - using surveillance technologies not to actually protect Americans or "fight terrorism", but rather to stifle dissent (i.e. anti-war activists, economic and social justice protesters, etc.), monitor political "enemies", bust small time drug dealers, and even eavesdrop on journalists.

I am eager to find out who some of these cell phone users were (if not by name, but reason) and why they were tracked. And of course, because the government says it will only use this new surveillance power when its warranted, doesn't mean it true! Let's not let yet another privacy protection and cornerstone of our judicial system fall prey to the pervasive and unwarranted fear of terrorism and the subsequent abuses it tends illicit from our government. Stay tuned...as this case will effect the way in which the Fourth Amendment is interpreted in today's technological age for the years to come...

Google and the NSA? Really?

When I heard that Google - the world's largest and ever expanding privacy allergic technological empire - had enlisted the National Security Agency (the agency responsible for such privacy violation greatest hits as warrantless wiretapping) for technical assistance to learn more about the computer network attackers who breached the company’s cybersecurity defenses last year, I thought, "what could possibly go wrong with this partnership?"

I'm being facetious of course, and I can't say I believe there's something necessarily nefarious going on here, but I wouldn't go so far as to say I believe the "anonymous sources" version of the story either.

Anyone that has read this blog knows I have written a number of posts about Google's confrontational relationship with privacy, and the variety of ways this can be demonstrated in a host of its products.

I've written about the approaching launch of Google Books just around the corner in which the ACLU, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Samuelson Clinic have even launched a Google Book Search privacy campaign to address. I've written about the loss of "Locational Privacy" and how a host of Google products relate to that growing privacy protection challenge.

And I've posted a lot about other examples demonstrating Google's less than stellar record on privacy in the past, from their lobbying efforts in Congress, to cloud computing, and to its increasing usage and expansion of behavioral marketing techniques.

In a nutshell, as I wrote a few months back, "It's inarguable that Google is rapidly becoming the official technology sponsor of the nation and globe. For the sake of argument, let's just accept this as truth, and assume this company's reach and breadth will only grow. With that in mind, it becomes paramount - and beholden on all those that relish privacy - to keep a close eye on this global leader's attention to privacy as it relates to their technological innovations."

My problems with the NSA are too numerous to detail here for you now, but let's just say they aren't known for their deep respect for privacy or the fourth amendment. In other words, we have the largest search engine company in the world teaming up with the federal agency in charge of global electronic surveillance...and what they're doing is confidential. Hmmm....

Noah Shachtman of Wired magazine makes some important points to consider:

The National Security Agency is widely understood to have the government’s biggest and smartest collection of geeks — the guys that are more skilled at network warfare than just about anyone on the planet. So, in a sense, it’s only natural that Google would turn to the NSA after the company was hit by an ultrasophisticated hack attack. After all, the military has basically done the same thing, putting the NSA in charge of its new “Cyber Command.” The Department of Homeland Security is leaning heavily on the NSA to secure .gov networks.

But there’s a problem. The NSA and its predecessors also have a long history of spying on huge numbers of people, both at home and abroad. During the Cold War, the agency worked with companies like Western Union to intercept and read millions of telegrams. During the war on terror years, the NSA teamed up with the telecommunications companies to eavesdrop on customers’ phone calls and internet traffic right from the telcos’ switching stations. And even after the agency pledged to clean up its act — and was given wide new latitude to spy on whom they liked – the NSA was still caught “overcollecting” on U.S. citizens.

According to The New York Times, the agency even “tried to wiretap a member of Congress without a warrant.”

All of which makes the NSA a particularly untrustworthy partner for a company that is almost wholly reliant on its customers’ trust and goodwill. We all know that Google automatically reads our Gmail and scans our Google Calendars and dives into our Google searches, all in an attempt to put the most relevant ads in front of us. But we’ve tolerated the automated intrusions, because Google’s products are so good, and we believed that the company was sincere in its “don’t be evil” mantra.

That’s a lot harder to swallow, when Google starts working cheek-to-jowl with the overcollectors. The company pinkie-swears that its agreement with the NSA won’t violate the company’s privacy policies or compromise user data. Those promises are a little hard to believe, given the NSA’s track record of getting private enterprises to cooperate, and Google’s willingness to take this first step.

So what exactly is the agreement between these two behemoths? That, unfortunately, isn't really clear - unless you believe those oh so trustworthy "anonymous sources". Here's what the New York Times had to say about the deal:

By turning to the N.S.A., which has no statutory authority to investigate domestic criminal acts, instead of the Department of Homeland Security, which does have such authority, Google is clearly seeking to avoid having its search engine, e-mail and other Web services regulated as part of the nation’s “critical infrastructure.”

The United States government has become increasingly concerned about the computer risks confronting energy and water distribution systems and financial and communications networks. Systems designated as critical infrastructure are increasingly being held to tighter regulatory standards.

On Jan. 12, Google announced a “new approach to China,” stating that the attacks were “highly sophisticated” and came from China. At the time, it gave few details about the attacks other than to say that a theft of its intellectual property had occurred and that a primary goal of the attackers had been to gain access to the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. In reaching out to the N.S.A., which has extensive abilities to monitor global Internet traffic, the company may have been hoping to gain more certainty about the identity of the attackers.

And the Washinton Post adds a bit more detail:

Google approached the NSA shortly after the attacks, sources said, but the deal is taking weeks to hammer out, reflecting the sensitivity of the partnership. Any agreement would mark the first time that Google has entered a formal information-sharing relationship with the NSA, sources said. In 2008, the firm stated that it had not cooperated with the NSA in its Terrorist Surveillance Program.

Sources familiar with the new initiative said the focus is not figuring out who was behind the recent cyberattacks -- doing so is a nearly impossible task after the fact -- but building a better defense of Google's networks, or what its technicians call "information assurance."

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The NSA would also be able to help the firm understand what methods are being used to penetrate its system, the sources said. Google, for its part, may share information on the types of malicious code seen in the attacks -- without disclosing proprietary data about what was taken, which would concern shareholders, sources said.

In other words, there's a lot still "unknown" here, outside of a few anonymous sources assuring us there will be no disclosures of proprietary data, on say, the tens of millions of google users. I'd also argue that it brings some perhaps some undesired, but needed attention on the Constitution subverting ways of the NSA.

As Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a Washington-based policy group, noted: “Google and N.S.A. are entering into a secret agreement that could impact the privacy of millions of users of Google’s products and services around the world."

He also believes the agreement covers much more than the Google hack, particularly in light of the fact that the search giant and intelligence agency were in talks prior to Google discovering that it had been hacked, stating, “What they’ve told you is that this is about an investigation of a hack involving China. I think and have good reason to believe that there’s a lot more going on.”

Wired magazine adds some needed depth to the Post and Times stories:

On Thursday, the organization filed a lawsuit against the N.S.A., calling for the release of information about the agency’s role as it was set out in National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 , a classified 2008 order issued by President George W. Bush dealing with cybersecurity and surveillance.

The FOIA request also seeks NSA communications with Google regarding Google’s failure to encrypt Gmail and cloud computing services. Rotenberg says EPIC wants to know what role the NSA has played in shaping privacy and security standards for Google’s services.

EPIC also filed a lawsuit against the NSA and the National Security Council, seeking a key document governing the government’s broader national cybersecurity policy, which has been shrouded in secrecy.

“We can’t afford to have secret cybersecurity policy that impacts the privacy rights of millions of internet users,” said Rotenberg.

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Matthew Aid, NSA historian and author of The Secret Sentry, said the move troubled him. “I’m a little uncomfortable with Google cooperating this closely with the nation’s largest intelligence agency, even if it’s strictly for defensive purposes,” he told the Post.

The NSA has been embroiled since 2005 in allegations that the agency violated federal laws in conducting illegal surveillance of Americans’ phone and internet communications. Giving the agency authority over coordination of the government’s cybersecurity plan — which would include working with telecoms and other critical companies in the private sector — could put the agency in the position of surreptitiously monitoring communications.

Click here to read the rest of the Wired article.

I want to conclude by going back to Noah Shachtman of Wired magazine, and his take on the business angle in all this:

Google may need help in fighting off these hacks. But turning to Ft. Meade could wind up permanently damaging the company’s image — and the foundation of its incredible success. Already, the Russian press are talking about Google’s decision to spy with NSA, for instance. Hackers might be able to compromise some of Google’s services, for a little while. The association with the NSA could permanently cripple the company. The telegram companies and the old-school telcos were virtually monopolies; customers had nowhere to turn, if they wanted private communications. Bing and Yahoo Mail are just a click away.

Needless to say, I'll be watching this story...

Congress and the FBI's Illegal Collection of Phone Records

I want to follow up today on a recent post I wrote about revelations regarding the FBI illegally collecting more than 2,000 U.S. telephone call records between 2002 and 2006 by invoking terrorism emergencies that did not exist or simply by persuading phone companies to provide records (remember Retroactive Immunity for the Telecoms...well, you're welcome you guys).

E-mails obtained by The Washington Post detailed how counter terrorism officials inside FBI headquarters did not follow their own procedures that were put in place to protect civil liberties. The stream of urgent requests for phone records also overwhelmed the FBI communications analysis unit with work that ultimately was not connected to imminent threats - another disturbing and re-occurring theme I want touch on more today.

The reason I'm coming back to this story is because the Los Angeles Times actually editorialized on the subject today - in favor of privacy and transparency I might add.

Since the editorial is short, I'll post it here in full:

A recent report from the Justice Department's internal watchdog adds new and disturbing detail to its previous criticism of the FBI for cutting legal corners to obtain telephone records of U.S. citizens. As with past evidence of wrongdoing, the bureau insists that it has changed its ways, but senators rightly are pressing the Obama administration to close a possible loophole that could allow future abuses.

In the aftermath of 9/11, between 2002 and 2006, FBI agents obtained thousands of calling records without following legal procedures. Nor were all the violations examples of unintentionally failing to cross a bureaucratic "T" or dot a technical "I." Some agents clearly regarded legal constraints on their actions as nuisances to be ignored.

In its third report on the subject in three years, the Office of the Inspector General describes an "egregious breakdown" in oversight. It details how agents abused "exigent letters" -- a device for obtaining records in an emergency -- and informally elicited information from compliant employees of telephone companies, requesting records through e-mails or by scribbles on Post-it notes. Sometimes investigators engaged in "sneak peeks" of confidential records in which they looked over the employees' shoulders at their computer screens. The FBI also made inaccurate statements about its use of exigent letters in court filings.

According to Inspector General Glenn A. Fine, the relationship between the FBI and the telephone companies was so intimate that company representatives were stationed in FBI communications centers. Thus firms with access to sensitive personal information were essentially partners with a powerful law enforcement agency in violation of Americans' privacy rights. The FBI insists that errors were unintentional and that improperly obtained information will be sealed or destroyed. But that doesn't alter the offensiveness of skirting procedure.

The inspector general's latest report concludes with specific recommendations -- including additional training and greater scrutiny of contracts with telecommunications firms -- to ensure that both the bureau and the companies abide by privacy laws. It also recommends the FBI consider disciplinary action for those who ignored or violated the law. Atty. Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr. should implement these recommendations.

Finally, the report suggests that the Justice Department may be reserving the right of the FBI to inspect telephone records "without legal process or a qualifying emergency." Several senators have rightly asked Holder to share a Jan. 8 memo that apparently outlines such an exception. Holder should comply. Congress needs to make sure for itself that the FBI is not being encouraged to return to its old ways.

Rather than re-invent the wheel, I'll just point readers to my post on this topic two weeks ago...because I "went off" on the disturbing pattern of government and corporate abuses of the peoples' privacy and constitutional rights since 9/11.

Here are a couple clips that I think are worthy of republishing today:

With each new "privacy revolting" revelation to make it public has come the subsequent validation of many of my darkest fears regarding how the government and law enforcement would abuse the unprecedented powers granted them in reaction to the September 11th attack. We should all be giving special thanks for the Freedom of Information Act and the work of privacy rights and civil liberties groups.

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An undeniable pattern has emerged over the past few years that fundamentally challenges the entire premise of a "war on terror" and exposes just how ineffectual and counterproductive these policies have actually been. The reoccurring theme goes like this: Powerful interests - inside and outside of government - sell fear as way to justify the steady assault on our civil liberties, increased spending on military defense, and the growth of the surveillance state.

But here's another important piece of the puzzle that keeps popping up: more often than not the government HASN'T USED these expanded powers to actually fight terrorism (instead often to thwart anti-war protesters, bust small time drug dealers, monitor journalists, and who knows what else?) - as was promised. This begs a larger question, "Who has been targeted and why?"

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...do these increasingly intrusive and even unconstitutional anti-terrorism measures actually make us any safer (or less so)? And if so, is it worth the price? And, how can any free society benefit from, or reconcile, such policies as illegal search and seizures (including of laptops), warrantless wiretapping, the tracking of GPS devices in peoples cell phones, the utilization of "whole-body-imaging" (digital strip search) scanners in airports, the evisceration of Habeus Corpus, Rendition, Military Tribunals, and the Patriot Act?

Another question worth pondering: Can we really "defeat" terrorism by embracing a less free and more fearful society (two primary goals of terrorists)? Similarly, don't many of these government abuses constitute a form of terrorism in and of itself? And finally, a growing amount of evidence now suggests that we are gathering TOO MUCH information, and our expanding surveillance state is making us LESS safe, not more.

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It is this irrational fear of terrorism that seems to be at the root of our nation's current "civil liberties and privacy" crisis. It is hard to imagine that without this fear, we would so easily give up our rights, support wars on countries that did nothing to us, and accept wasting precious resources on ineffective and burdensome security systems that diminish our quality of life (think of airports)?

Read the rest here.

Whole-Body-Imaging, the Health Threat, and the Security Industry Lobby

I have written a lot about the latest privacy invasive security “savior” being peddled by the Fear-Industrial-Complex (another term I've heard floated is the Homeland-Security-Industrial-Complex) called “Whole-Body-Imaging” ("digital strip search"). These full-body scanners use one of two technologies - millimeter wave sensors or backscatter x-rays - to see through clothing, producing images of naked passengers.

I want to revisit the topic because of two articles I have come across in the past two days that further expose the myriad of reasons why these scanners are not a good idea.

Profiting off Fear

As with any modern "defense issue", there are big money interests advocating on behalf of these scanners - namely a variety of security industry companies and former high level officials like Michael Chertoff seeking to profit off the publics' irrational fear of terrorism. As an article in today's Los Angeles Times details, this industry is exploding in both profits and clout in the Capitol.

The Obama administration alone set aside $1 billion last year in stimulus funds for new security technology for the TSA. In January 2007, an article documenting its rising profile noted that "Rapiscan's (the primary manufacturer of "body scanners" and a client of Michael Chertoff) presence on Capitol Hill pays off," with the company having opened a new Washington office and hiring a number of outside lobbyists. As the article details:

"The results have been apparent. Last year the company did $17 million to $20 million in contracts. Over the past six months, the company has had $40 million in sales to the US government, compared with $8 million in 2004. 'We plan to dramatically expand in the next few years well above the multimillion-dollar [mark],' says Peter Kant, vice president of government affairs for Rapiscan…Rapiscan also decided last year to join the political money game in a more coordinated effort, by creating a political action committee.

Kant says he expects the PAC to raise $50,000 to $75,000 a year and donate equally to both parties. Previously, about 60 percent of the political donations from the firm's executives went to Republicans…How Rapiscan and other homeland-security companies will fare in the new political climate is still unclear. Lawmakers are expected to increase oversight and investigation of homeland-security issues such as government contracts."

As further noted in the Truthout.org article I'm featuring today by Randall Amster J.D., Ph.D.:

...Rapiscan received $25.4 million from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) by way of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (i.e., the Stimulus Bill), to produce 150 new full-body scanners to be used at airports across the United States. Peter Kant, a vice president at Rapiscan, said that the government has given the TSA the green light to spend up to $173 million on new scanners, which could lead to the emplacement of hundreds of such devices in the near future. Interestingly, the $25.4 million tendered to Rapiscan for the first 150 scanners was formally awarded in September 2009, well ahead of the Christmas Day bombing attempt that has set off the recent flurry of scanner demands. According to recovery.gov, Rapiscan also received $2.9 million in stimulus monies in May 2009. The total number of jobs created by these millions in stimulus funds is estimated at 40.

In addition to the stimulus money recently administered, the US Army just announced an award of a no-bid contract to Rapiscan for 12 scanners to be used at military bases in Iraq and Kuwait. Previously, in December 2009, Rapiscan received a $5 million contract from NATO to provide screening devices for use in Afghanistan.

It goes without saying that there's also a political component to the recent push for these scanners, as elected officials are constantly seeking to score political points in the hopes of establishing their "tough on terror" credentials.

Privacy Concerns and TSA Lies

I have detailed the privacy implications, which I will touch upon again today. Let's face it, being digitally strip searched without probable cause at every airport by the least opens a pandora's box (where next will we use these scanners?)...and wets an already terror driven slipper slope.

And now, with this much money at stake, it should be no surprise that - thanks to the work of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and with help from the Freedom of Information Act -we now know for a fact that TSA officials have been misleading the public by claiming these scanners cannot store or send their graphic images.

According to the 2008 documents obtained by EPIC, the TSA specified that the machines must have image storage and sending abilities when in "test mode."Even taking into account the "test mode" caveat, these documents are contrary to the representations that have been made in recent weeks by TSA officials that the machines have "zero storage capability".

On the TSA's own Web site - in an effort to assure passengers their privacy is protected - it specifically says "the system has no way to save, transmit or print the image." Now we know that these devices DO include the ability to store, record and transfer images of passengers screened at U.S. airports, including hard disk storage and USB integration and Ethernet connectivity. In other words, the privacy concerns articulated by civil liberties advocates were not overstated.

Security Benefits Overstated

The claimed security benefits of these scanners have also proven to be highly dubious. It remains debatable in fact whether this technology would have even detected the “underwear bomber”. This is in contrast to what we do know: if law enforcement had simply acted on the information it had already gathered - like the warnings of the “underwear bomber's” father - the plot would have been foiled much earlier.

Another point to consider before embracing this latest "terror fix" is that for every specific tactic we target with a new, expensive, and often burdensome security apparatus, the terrorist's tactics themselves will change (including use of body cavities). Risks can be reduced for a given target, but not eliminated. If we strip searched every single passenger at every airport in the country, terrorists would try to bomb shopping malls or movie theaters.

New Concerns Over Threat to Health

And now, as the article entitled "Invasion of the Body Scanners" details, there are new concerns that question the untested nature of these technologies and whether they are in fact safe for widespread use. As an article from NaturalNews (recently reprinted by Truthout) observed:

"In researching the biological effects of the millimeter wave scanners used for whole body imaging at airports, NaturalNews has learned that the energy emitted by the machines may damage human DNA . Millimeter wave machines represent one of two primary technologies currently being used for the 'digital strip searches' being conducted at airports around the world. 'The Transportation Security Administration utilizes two technologies to capture naked images of air travelers - backscatter x-ray technology and millimeter wave technology,' reports the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a non-profit currently suing the US government to stop these electronic strip searches.

In order to generate the nude image of the human body, these machines emit terahertz photons - high-frequency energy 'particles' that can pass through clothing and body tissue. The manufacturers of such machines claim they are perfectly safe and present no health risks, but a study conducted by Boian S. Alexandrov (and colleagues) at the Center for Nonlinear Studies at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico showed that these terahertz waves could 'unzip double-stranded DNA, creating bubbles in the double strand that could significantly interfere with processes such as gene expression and DNA replication.'"

The Los Alamos study, which can be found in an online physics journal and is further analyzed in MIT's Technology Review (TR), opens the door for more in-depth investigations of this technology that is about to become pervasive, since, as TR noted, "a new generation of cameras are set to appear that not only record terahertz waves but also bombard us with them. And if our exposure is set to increase, the question that urgently needs answering is what level of terahertz exposure is safe."

And yet, as NaturalNews indicated, "no such long-term safety testing has ever been conducted by a third party. There have been no clinical trials indicating that multiple exposures to such terahertz waves, accumulated over a long period of time, are safe for humans." Given what we already know about the effects of radiation, as well as the initial report from Los Alamos, this would seem at a minimum to be a circumstance requiring greater study before mass deployment. It is more likely, however, that these untested devices will be in place long before adequate testing is done, suggesting that any such safety analysis will simply be undertaken as the devices are being used on human subjects at airports across the US and around the world.

Now to the rest of today's featured article by Dr. Amster, a professor of peace studies at Prescott College and the executive director of the Peace & Justice Studies Association:

And then there are the obvious matters of privacy and dignity. One need not be a constitutional scholar or privacy-rights advocate to appreciate the implications of conducting such invasive de facto "strip searches" on a widespread scale.

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The New York Times further noted that "others say that the technology is no security panacea, and that its use should be carefully controlled because of the risks to privacy, including the potential for its ghostly naked images to show up on the Internet." Indeed, as Baltimore Sun columnist Susan Reimer intoned: "They say these full-body screening images - in which I am pretty sure we are naked - are immediately erased, but I don't believe them for a minute. Either somebody is keeping them on the hard drive to protect himself in case some terrorist gets by on his watch, or some enterprising guy is going to be selling Britney Spears' body scan to TMZ for a hundred thousand bucks. I mean this is America, land of the irrepressible entrepreneurial spirit." Absent clear and enforceable limitations, it seems likely that such scenarios will ensue.

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Despite being known as a fairly Puritanical people in many respects - at least in terms of what constitutes "public decency" and the like - it seems that Americans perhaps are more permissive in their sense of decorum than we have been led to believe. Is it still voyeurism when the subject willingly desires to be watched? Must security and privacy exist in tension, or can they be fruitfully reconciled? Is constant surveillance becoming the baseline of our lives, and if so, who is watching the watchers? With the proliferation of public cameras, digital recorders, webcams, cellphone cameras and, now, terahertz scanners, we will be confronted with the implications of these technologies for the foreseeable future. The fact that our collective fears seem to be the leading edge of the debate doesn't bode particularly well for reasoned decision-making and the eventual utilization of new technologies for emancipation rather than subjugation.

And in the End …

The matter of full-body scanners presents a critical cultural referendum on basic questions of freedom and autonomy. The circumstances under which the issue is being presented - a climate of fear instilled by a well-hyped reminder of the shared trauma of 9/11 - make it almost impossible to have confidence in a sound and sober resolution. Moreover, the primary players behind the use of these technologies are imbricated within the workings of a growing military-industrial complex that continues to pervade more aspects of our lives.

This watershed moment in the public dialogue about security and privacy is framed by an increasing militarization of everyday life in America, as indicated by a recollection of the loci in which companies like Rapiscan operate - namely, "at airports, government and corporate buildings, correctional and prison facilities, postal facilities, military zones, sea ports and border crossings." This list could easily expand to include schools, hospitals, malls, arenas, banks, stores, and more. Now is the moment to rein it in while we still have a window of self-determination in which to do so.

Click here to read the article in its entirety.

I would just conclude today by reiterating a few points I have made here in the past. This increasingly influential "Fear-Industrial-Complex" (i.e. Department of Defense, corporate media, talk radio, security technologies industry, Congress, the White House, “the intelligence community”, pundits, weapons defense contractors, etc.) serves as a kind of de facto terror hype machine that is far more interested in maximizing profit and power than reducing any threat posed by terrorism.

The False Choice: Privacy versus Security

The unholy alliance of political expediency and corporate profit that is largely behind the "selling of these scanners" belies the false choice that pits "security against civil liberties". Sadly, this fundamentally dishonest "frame" is nearly universally accepted as fact and parroted by the corporate media, big business, and the government.

If we are truly trying to reduce the threat of terrorism there are DEMONSTRABLY more effective ways than those currently being pursued. A few alternative tactics to consider: stop bombing and occupying Muslim nations, arming their enemies, torturing and indefinitely jailing their people, and propping up many of their countries most ruthless dictators.

As I wrote in "The Politics of Fear and Whole-Body-Imaging": No one is denying that terrorism is a threat or seeking to justify their crimes, but how does creating more of them make us safer? And instead of spending one more minute listening to the grumblings of a war criminal like Dick Cheney, we would do well to heed the words of Martin Luther King Jr. instead: "We all have to be concerned about terrorism, but you will never end terrorism by terrorizing others."

Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) articulates why reducing privacy doesn't guarantee better security, stating "It's a mistake to believe you can trade privacy for security. A lot of times people give up privacy and they're no more secure. I'm very skeptical of people who say that if you only trade in privacy, you'll get more security. I don't think that's true, and body scanners are a good example of that."

I want to conclude with my "go to" quote that I think best dismantles the Privacy vs. Security lie from security expert Bruce Schneier, author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World:

"If you set up the false dichotomy, of course people will choose security over privacy -- especially if you scare them first. But it's still a false dichotomy. There is no security without privacy. And liberty requires both security and privacy. The famous quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin reads: "Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety." It's also true that those who would give up privacy for security are likely to end up with neither.”

Court Rules Mass Surveillance of Americans is Immune From Judicial Review

For those that might have missed last week's bit of bad news, a federal judge dismissed Jewel v. NSA, a case from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) on behalf of AT&T customers challenging the National Security Agency's mass surveillance of millions of ordinary Americans' phone calls and emails. The group plans to appeal the decision.

For a little backdrop on this ongoing story, let me refresh our memories. First, to highlight the gravity of this issue and why its still critically important to address: Last year, a government report was released that disclosed that President Bush authorized secret surveillance activities that went beyond the previously disclosed NSA program – raising the prospect of additional unlawful conduct.

This new information had led to concerns in Congress about the agency’s ability to collect and read domestic e-mail messages of Americans on a widespread basis. Supporting that conclusion is the account of a former N.S.A. analyst who, in a series of interviews, described being trained in 2005 for a program in which the agency routinely examined large volumes of Americans’ e-mail messages without court warrants. Two intelligence officials confirmed that the program was still in operation.

Then we got another report, one that has only added to the building uproar against this program and in favor of investigations and prosecutions. This new report, mandated by Congress and produced by the inspectors general of five federal agencies, found that other intelligence tools used in assessing security threats posed by terrorists provided more timely and detailed information. In fact, NOT ONE instance could be cited that demonstrated the wiretapping program prevented any attack of any kind, ever. Nor did it lead to the capture of any terrorists.

In light of these facts, one would think that the Obama Administration would come down somewhere at least close to the position that candidate Obama espoused on the campaign trail. Sadly, the opposite has been true.

In fact, all we have to show as a nation since this program was exposed is additional protections (and retroactive immunity) to telecom companies for sharing our private information with the government, and more legal cover for the Executive Branch to carry out similar efforts in the future.

As we now all know, both Obama and Holder have completely reversed themselves on the issue of wiretapping, by not only refusing to prosecute or investigate the program and/or those that carried it out, but have even expanded their defense of the program in some important key respects.
So another route was taken by EFF: The Courts. Initially, Chief U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker of San Francisco ruled in 2006 that the AT&T customers could sue the company for allegedly allowing federal agents to intercept their calls and e-mails and seize their records without a warrant.

Last year, Judge Vaughn Walker threw out more than three dozen lawsuits claiming that the nation’s major telecommunications companies had illegally assisted in the wiretapping without warrants program approved by President Bush after the 2001 terrorist attacks.

But, while he said the objections of the privacy groups were not strong enough to override the wishes of Congress, Judge Walker did show some sympathy for the plaintiffs’ claims. He had refused the government’s efforts to invoke the “state secrets” privilege and had moved toward compelling the Justice Department to turn over documents.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation and the ACLU appealed the case - a case in which Judge Walker kept intact related claims against the government over the wiretapping program, as well as a suit by an Oregon charity that says it has evidence it was a target of wiretapping without warrants.

As the Chronicle editorialized last year:

In the current case, several dozen phone customers are before a federal judge here asking that the government turn over data on eavesdropping. A prior suit against the phone companies for going along with the illegal surveillance was dismissed after Congress re-wrote domestic spying rules last year and indemnified the firms. Obama, then a senator, voted for changes in a surprising shift from his campaign-trail rhetoric that heavily criticized the abuses of civil liberties in the war on terrorism.

The Obama team is making the same arguments made by the Bush administration in denying it needs to explain anything. Allowing an open-court case will lay bare state secrets, your honor, and the country will lose a "crown jewel" piece of intelligence gathering, according to one Justice Department attorney. The spying may have been improper, but, sorry, we can't really talk about it....

The decision in his lap isn't an easy one. He can side with Obama lawyers and dismiss the case in the name of national security, a path that courts often take when confronted with a flag-waving invocation of homeland defense. Or he can open up a dark chapter in the nation's history to the plain light of legal examination. Such a decision would definitely roil the waters while the truth surfaces. But since the president won't do it, it's time the courts stepped in.

And now that brings us to last week's latest disappointment coming out of the courts. As the San Francisco Chronicle reported:

Unlike the AT&T suit, which was based on the company's contracts with its customers and its duty to maintain their privacy, the new suit was a claim of government wrongdoing that required evidence that the plaintiffs were the targets, Walker said.

To establish the right to sue, a private citizen must demonstrate a "direct, personal stake in the outcome" and cannot merely claim "a right to have the government follow the law," Walker said. Because the AT&T customers have no evidence that they were personally wiretapped, he said, they cannot differentiate themselves from "the mass of telephone and Internet users in the United States."

Walker is still considering a lawsuit by an Islamic group that was accidentally sent a government document reportedly showing it had been wiretapped.

Click here to read the rest of the Chronicle article.

In the decision, Judge Walker held the peculiar position that the privacy harm to millions of Americans from the illegal spying dragnet was not a "particularized injury" but instead a "generalized grievance" because almost everyone in the United States has a phone and Internet service.

in response to this interpretation, EFF stated: "We're deeply disappointed in the judge's ruling. This ruling robs innocent telecom customers of their privacy rights without due process of law. Setting limits on Executive power is one of the most important elements of America's system of government, and judicial oversight is a critical part of that."

"The alarming upshot of the court's decision is that so long as the government spies on all Americans, the courts have no power to review or halt such mass surveillance even when it is flatly illegal and unconstitutional. With new revelations of illegal spying being reported practically every other week -- just this week, we learned that the FBI has been unlawfully obtaining Americans' phone records using Post-It notes rather than proper legal process -- the need for judicial oversight when it comes to government surveillance has never been clearer."

Jewel v. NSA is aimed at ending the NSA's dragnet surveillance of millions of ordinary Americans and holding accountable the government officials who illegally authorized it. Evidence in the case includes undisputed documents provided by former AT&T telecommunications technician Mark Klein showing AT&T has routed copies of Internet traffic to a secret room in San Francisco controlled by the NSA. That same evidence is central to Hepting v. AT&T, a class-action lawsuit that's currently under appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.

Click here to read more from EFF.

To recap: according to the Bush and Obama Administrations, and unfortunately this court, since citizens cannot show their messages were intercepted, they have no right to sue, because all such information is secret. And, disclosure of whether AT&T took part in the program would tip off our enemies, so we can't have that either. And now, we discover a new addition to this twisted logic: Since no individual can prove the harm done specifically to him/her, and this invasion of privacy threatens EVERYONE, there's nothing the court can do in the peoples defense. Nice.

I'll be following the appeal...

FBI used phony "terrorism emergencies" to illegally collect individual call records

Gee, you starting to see the same pattern that I am? With each new "privacy revolting" revelation to make it public has come the subsequent validation of many of my darkest fears regarding how the government and law enforcement would abuse the unprecedented powers granted them in reaction to the September 11th attack. We should all be giving special thanks for the Freedom of Information Act and the work of privacy rights and civil liberties groups!

The latest Constitution smashing headlines have an all too familiar ring: The FBI illegally collected more than 2,000 U.S. telephone call records between 2002 and 2006 by invoking terrorism emergencies that did not exist or simply by persuading phone companies to provide records (remember Retroactive Telecom Immunity?).

E-mails obtained by The Washington Post have detailed how counter terrorism officials inside FBI headquarters did not follow their own procedures that were put in place to protect civil liberties. The stream of urgent requests for phone records also overwhelmed the FBI communications analysis unit with work that ultimately was not connected to imminent threats - another disturbing and re-occurring theme I want touch on more today.

But before I go deeper into this story, lets take a step back and start connecting some dots. An undeniable pattern has emerged over the past few years that fundamentally challenges the entire premise of a "war on terror" and exposes just how ineffectual and counterproductive these policies have actually been. The reoccurring theme goes like this: Powerful interests - inside and outside of government - sell fear as way to justify the steady assault on our civil liberties, increased spending on military defense, and the growth of the surveillance state.

But here's another important piece of the puzzle that keeps popping up: more often than not the government HASN'T USED these expanded powers to actually fight terrorism (instead often to thwart anti-war protesters, bust small time drug dealers, monitor journalists, and who knows what else?) - as was promised. This begs a larger question, "Who has been targeted and why?"

This increasingly influential "Fear-Industrial-Complex" (i.e. Department of Defense, corporate media, talk radio, security technologies industry, Congress, the White House, “the intelligence community”, pundits, weapons defense contractors, etc.) almost serve as a kind of de facto terror hype machine that is far more interested in maximizing profit and power than reducing any threat posed by terrorism. This fact belies the false choice we are constantly offered pitting "security against civil liberties". Sadly, this fundamentally dishonest "frame" is nearly universally accepted as fact and parroted by the corporate media, big business, and the government.

In other words, do these increasingly intrusive and even unconstitutional anti-terrorism measures actually make us any safer (or less so)? And if so, is it worth the price? And, how can any free society benefit from, or reconcile, such policies as illegal search and seizures (including of laptops), warrantless wiretapping, the tracking of GPS devices in peoples cell phones, the utilization of "whole-body-imaging" (digital strip search) scanners in airports, the evisceration of Habeus Corpus, Rendition, Military Tribunals, and the Patriot Act?

Another question worth pondering: Can we really "defeat" terrorism by embracing a less free and more fearful society (two primary goals of terrorists)? Similarly, don't many of these government abuses constitute a form of terrorism in and of itself? And finally, a growing amount of evidence now suggests that we are gathering TOO MUCH information, and our expanding surveillance state is making us LESS safe, not more.

As Constitutional Scholar Glenn Greenwald notes, “The problem is never that the U.S. Government lacks sufficient power to engage in surveillance, interceptions, intelligence-gathering and the like. Long before 9/11 -- from the Cold War -- we have vested extraordinarily broad surveillance powers in the U.S. Government to the point that we have turned ourselves into a National Security and Surveillance State.

Terrorist attacks do not happen because there are too many restrictions on the government's ability to eavesdrop and intercept communications, or because there are too many safeguards and checks. If anything, the opposite is true: the excesses of the Surveillance State -- and the steady abolition of oversights and limits -- have made detection of plots far less likely. Despite that, we have an insatiable appetite -- especially when we're frightened anew -- to vest more and more unrestricted spying and other powers in our Government, which -- like all governments -- is more than happy to accept it.”

It is this irrational fear of terrorism that seems to be at the root of our nation's current "civil liberties and privacy" crisis. It is hard to imagine that without this fear, we would so easily give up our rights, support wars on countries that did nothing to us, and accept wasting precious resources on ineffective and burdensome security systems that diminish our quality of life (think of airports)?

Remember: Your chances of getting hit by lightning in one year is 500,000 to 1 while the odds you'll be killed by a terrorist on a plane over 10 years is 10 million to 1.

If you count the Ft. Hoot shooting as a terrorist attack, 16 people have died in the United States as result of terrorism in 2009. The other three deaths include the Little Rock military recruiting office shooting, the Holocaust Museum shooting, and Dr. George Tiller's assassination, the last two coming at the hands of right-wing extremists. Now let's compare that to the 45,000 Americans that died because they didn't have health insurance and 600 that died from salmonella poisoning.

If we are truly trying to reduce the threat of terrorism there are DEMONSTRABLY more effective ways than those currently being pursued. A few alternative tactics to consider: stop bombing and occupying Muslim nations, arming their enemies, torturing and indefinitely jailing their people, and propping up many of their countries most ruthless dictators.

As I wrote in "The Politics of Fear and Whole-Body-Imaging": No one is denying that terrorism is a threat or seeking to justify their crimes, but how does creating more of them make us safer? And instead of spending one more minute listening to the grumblings of a war criminal like Dick Cheney, we would do well to heed the words of Martin Luther King Jr. instead: "We all have to be concerned about terrorism, but you will never end terrorism by terrorizing others."

I still think security expert Bruce Schneier sums up the false choice best:

"If you set up the false dichotomy, of course people will choose security over privacy -- especially if you scare them first. But it's still a false dichotomy. There is no security without privacy. And liberty requires both security and privacy. The famous quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin reads: "Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety." It's also true that those who would give up privacy for security are likely to end up with neither.”

With all that said, let's get to the Washington Post article on the FBI using phony "terrorism emergencies" to justify the illegal collection of Americans phone records. John Solomon and Carrie Johnson report:

Documents show that senior FBI managers up to the assistant director level approved the procedures for emergency requests of phone records and that headquarters officials often made the requests, which persisted for two years after bureau lawyers raised concerns and an FBI official began pressing for changes.

"We have to make sure we are not taking advantage of this system, and that we are following the letter of the law without jeopardizing national security," FBI lawyer Patrice Kopistansky wrote in one of a series of early 2005 e-mails asking superiors to address the problem.

The FBI acknowledged in 2007 that one unit in the agency had improperly gathered some phone records, and a Justice Department audit at the time cited 22 inappropriate requests to phone companies for searches and hundreds of questionable requests. But the latest revelations show that the improper requests were much more numerous under the procedures approved by the top level of the FBI.

...

The USA Patriot Act expanded the use of national security letters by letting lower-level officials outside Washington approve them and allowing them in wider circumstances. But the letters still required the FBI to link a request to an open terrorism case before records could be sought.

Shortly after the Patriot Act was passed in October 2001, FBI senior managers devised their own system for gathering records in terrorism emergencies. A new device called an "exigent circumstances letter" was authorized. It allowed a supervisor to declare an emergency and get the records, then issue a national security letter after the fact.

...

The 2003 memo stated that the new method "has the potential of generating an enormous amount of data in short order, much of which may not actually be related to the terrorism activity under investigation." Within a few years, hundreds of emergency requests were completed and a few thousand phone records gathered. But many lacked the follow-up: the required national security letters. Two individuals began raising concerns.

...

The e-mails show that they conceived the idea to open half a dozen "generic" or "broad" preliminary investigative (PI) case files to which all unauthorized emergency requests could be charged so a national security letter could be issued after the fact.

The generic files were to cover such broad topics as "threats against transportation facilities," "threats against individuals" and "threats against special events," the e-mails show. Eventually, FBI officials shifted to a second strategy of crafting a "blanket" national security letter to authorize all past searches that had not been covered by open cases.

...

Among those whose phone records were searched improperly were journalists for The Washington Post and the New York Times, according to interviews with government officials. The searches became public when Mueller, the FBI director, contacted top editors at the two newspapers in August 2008 and apologized for the breach of reporters' phone records. The reporters were Ellen Nakashima of The Post, who had been based in Jakarta, Indonesia, and Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez of the Times, who had also been working in Jakarta.

Click here to read the article in its entirety.

What immediately jumps out at me in this article is that last paragraph I posted: JOURNALISTS PHONE RECORDS WERE SEARCHED! Monitoring and intimidating the press strikes at the heart of what it means to be a functional democracy. I hope we learn more about how often this was used and for what reasons and on what reporters.

What also has been made abundantly clear these past few years is that once you allow the government to snoop unchecked in the name of national security, that' s exactly what they're going to do.

As Adam Sewer of the American Prospect notes: It's no secret that the FBI's use of National Security Letters - a surveillance tool that allows the FBI to gather reams of information on Americans from third-party entities (like your bank) without a warrant or without suspecting you of a crime - have resulted in widespread abuses.

All that the FBI needs to demand your private information from a third-party entity is an assertion that such information is "relevant" to a national security investigation -- and the NSLs come with an accompanying gag order that's almost impossible to challenge in court.

Privacy Groups Challenge Government on Laptop Seizures

Before I get to the latest efforts by the ACLU (among others) to challenge the government's incredibly intrusive seizures of peoples laptop computers at, or even near, border checkpoints, I want to direct you to some just published - and deeply disturbing - poll results.

The Quinnipiac survey above all else proves that fear still sells in America. Or, as I said in my critique of "Whole-Body-Imaging" scanners, the immense power of fear on the human mind, the growing influence of the security industrial complex, and the craven desire among politicians to use the threat of terrorism to score political points would be difficult to overcome.

In light of the extraordinary amount of propaganda and fear peddling the public has been subjected to since the attempted terrorist attack on a flight bound for Detroit, these numbers shouldn't be that shocking - but are disappointing nonetheless.

Among the findings were these irrational gems: Americans overwhelmingly now support (84 – 13 percent) greater use of airport body scanners, otherwise known as digital strip searches. Another 86 – 11 percent support new airport security measures even if they mean longer delays in air travel.

Voters also disagree with President Obama’s plan to try suspected terrorists in civilian courts (of course, he only advocates that for SOME...NOT ALL), saying 59 – 34 percent they should be tried in military courts.

They also say (52 – 44 percent) that law enforcement should be able to single out people who look Middle-Eastern for screening and questions, and by 79 – 16 percent, they back the recent decision to subject air travelers from 14 designated countries – most of them nations with large Muslim populations – to extra screening.

But that's not all: 63 percent of voters said that the government’s anti-terror policies lean too far toward protecting civil rights rather than national security (25 percent said they did not). And solid majorities even oppose the closing of our nation's shame: Guantanamo.

And perhaps this final question helps answer the "how the hell could people think this way?" question: More than three out of four respondents say it is very likely (35 percent) or somewhat likely (43 percent) that in the near future there will be a terrorist attack in the United States with a large number of casualties (and of course, strip searches, torture, and profiling DON'T MAKE US SAFER ANYWAY).

I don't want to go into a long diatribe today about what these numbers tell me, but suffice it to say, what is abundantly clear is we have completely lost touch with the core principles espoused in our Constitution.

Now to the issue of laptop seizures in "border patrol zones". As I wrote about here last year, these zones essentially allow government agents to stop and question people anywhere without suspicion within 100 miles of the border. This little known power of the federal government to set up immigration checkpoints far from the nation's border lines came about after 9/11, when Congress gave the Department of Homeland Security the right to use some of its powers deeper within the country.

According to the ACLU in October of 2008, the Department of Homeland Security had set up at least 33 internal checkpoints where they stop people, question them and ask them to prove citizenship. At that time I noted that if we allow these kinds of constitutional violations along our border, how long will it take before we start allowing them in the heartland? And I tend to be of the opinion that anytime we weaken the rights of ANYONE, we weaken them for EVERYONE.

And that brings us to the the supposed right of these border agents, for any reason they deem appropriate, to look into or even seize your laptop computer and all that it contains within.

So, for ANY reason, YOUR laptop and everything you have stored on it, can be taken from you by the government...the same government responsible for Abu Graihb, Rendition, Guantanamo, warrantless wiretapping, military tribunals, the Patriot Act, and the evisceration of Habeus Corpus.

In response to the work of the ACLU, the government came back with a slightly less intrusive policy, requiring the CBP to complete a search of an electronic device within five days and ICE to complete a search within 30 days.

In addition, agents must take additional steps to inform and educate travelers about the searches, and the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties will conduct an assessment of the policy's impact on civil rights within 120 days.

Nonetheles, the battle has not waned, and has recently intensified with a pair of civil rights groups - the ACLU and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (with support from EFF) - seeking potential plaintiffs for a lawsuit that challenges the practice of laptop seizures.

Agam Shah of PC World reports:

The groups argue that the practice of suspicionless laptop searches violates fundamental rights of freedom of speech and protection against unreasonable seizures and searches...(and) have the support of Electronic Frontier Foundation, which has argued in court that laptop searches are invasive because devices like laptops contain personal data, which people should be able to keep private. EFF has also argued that some searches have been conducted without s

...

NACDL believes the policy "erodes fundamental privacy rights generally," the group said on its Web site. It "has a particularly chilling impact on lawyers who travel abroad with legal documents that are subject to the attorney-client or work-product privileges," NACDL wrote.

Last year, a document surfaced on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Web site that authorized U.S. agents to seize and retain laptops indefinitely. Government agents belonging to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which is a part of DHS, were also authorized to seize electronic devices including portable media players and cell phones and inspect documents in them.

...

The ACLU is already challenging DHS in court over the issue. In August last year, the group filed a suit against the DHS after it was denied access to documents to learn about the policy. The EFF and the Asian Law Caucus (ALC) also filed a case last year against the DHS after they were denied access to records on questioning and searches of travelers at U.S. borders.

Click here to read more.